Does language access new domains of meaning impossible to access otherwise?
Are there concepts (mathematical or otherwise) which require symbolic representation not just to communicate, but to exist as coherent thoughts at all?
I am assuming that any symbolic representation is reducible to language.
Now, one could say that this question doesn't make a lot of sense due to the following claim.
Claim: This question is equivalent to asking "does having new tools (language/symbolic representation/formal system) mean you have new perspectives (meaning/thoughts), which couldn't be had otherwise?"
I will try to put forward some cases to not accept this trivially.
Case 1
P1: (Content Dependency) Some mental contents C require specific structural operations O to exist as coherent intentional states.
P2: (Structural Necessity) For these contents C, the structural operations O are not merely helpful for manipulation or communication, but necessary for the content to have determinate meaning.
P3: (Symbolic Realization) Certain structural operations O (like recursive embedding, negation, quantification over infinite domains) can only be realized through symbolic/linguistic representational systems.
P4: (Existence Condition) If a mental content C requires structural operations O that can only be realized symbolically, then C cannot exist as a coherent thought without symbolic representation.
Conclusion: Therefore, some thoughts literally cannot exist without symbolic scaffolding - the representation is constitutive of the thought content itself.
Does this make language special?
Case 1.1: No. One could argue its not special (atleast wrt this CoT) because spatial and temporal representation can constitute unique thought domains.
Case 1.2: Yes. Language is maximally dependent. Capacity for language implicitly requires the capacity for other representations (spatial, temporal, etc.). A blind man not being able to know how Burj Khalifa looks or a man without hands not being able to know how to open a jar with hands (limitation of experiential access) is not the same as a cat not being able to know Godel Incompleteness (limitation of conceptual access).
(Would you consider Cantor not knowing Godel Incompleteness a limitation of experiential access or conceptual access?)
Case 2
P1: (Content Independence) Mental contents C exist independently of any particular representational system.
P2: (Efficiency Only) Symbolic representations merely make existing contents easier to manipulate, remember, or communicate.
P3: (Multiple Realizability) Any content accessible through symbolic representation could theoretically be accessed through other means (intuition, imagery, etc.).
Does this make language special? Yes, but only because of the efficiency of compressing meaning and communicating.
Note: I am collapsing all of formal logic, math, programming languages, natural language etc. into "language" so that it encompasses all symbolic representational systems. I would even argue that having the cognitive capacity to understand one natural language is enough to understand every natural or formal language.
Edit: replaced creating with accessing because creation implies access but access need not imply creation. This way maybe we can go around the question of whether meaning is at all created.
Edit: remove the old set of premises and added new statements for clarity. Not sure if it's working xD.