"周恩来与中华民族伟大复兴"研讨会在淮安举行

Question

In much of contemporary philosophy, conceptual analysis is presented as the task of uncovering the necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of a concept (e.g., “X is knowledge iff X is justified true belief”). Critics of that project often argue that it fails because our everyday concepts are too messy or context?sensitive.

This raises a fundamental question about the aims of conceptual analysis:

Is conceptual analysis simply a descriptive enterprise—i.e. an attempt to report how a linguistic community actually uses a term—or does it have a normative dimension that prescribes how we ought to use our terms?

In particular:

Descriptive vs. Normative: If conceptual analysis is merely descriptive, it would aim to catalog usage patterns (much like a lexicographer). But if it’s normative, it would tell us how we should talk in order to best serve our epistemic or ethical goals: this is known as 'conceptual engineering' or the 'analytic project'.

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Haslanger (2000) distinguishes three kinds of projects in the study of terms like “gender” and “race” [1]:

• Descriptive projects

  1. Aim to chart how a community actually uses terms like “gender” or “race.”
  2. Ask whether our vocabularies successfully track real social kinds, and if not, why we continue to use them.
  3. Are largely empirical in method, resting on observations of actual linguistic usage.

• Conceptual projects

  1. Aim to make explicit the individual or group?specific concepts people hold.
  2. Ask what goes into my or our concept of “woman” or “Chinese” (as opposed to the wider community’s use).
  3. Are more “personal,” focusing on how particular speakers internally structure a concept.

• Analytic projects

  1. Aim to evaluate and improve concepts in light of certain goals or values.
  2. Ask what purposes our current concepts serve and whether alternative definitions would better advance, e.g., social justice or epistemic clarity.
  3. Are explicitly normative: they prescribe which concepts we should adopt.

Questions:

1. Normative/Engineering Component: What arguments support or against viewing conceptual analysis as having a normative or “ameliorative” dimension?
2. Personal Aspect: What does it mean, in practice, for a project to be more “personal” (as opposed to communal or empirical)?
3. What does it mean to "define" a term? Would such a Haslangian distinction of descriptive, normative and analytic be meaningful? If so, please explain using examples.

Any further readings would be greatly appreciated!

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[1]: Haslanger, S. (2000). “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?” No?s, 34(1), 31–55.

Answer 1

I think conceptual analysis is fundamental in philosophy. What interests me the most is what people do with concepts. Sometimes people illuminate a certain 'thing' or agenda with a well-crafted concept; and sometimes they obscure it, they hide some 'thing' or agenda with their words.

So, IMO a strong argument supporting conceptual analysis as having a normative or “ameliorative” dimension is to expose dissimulative and manipulative uses of concepts, along the lines of Kant's categorical impetative. If everybody uses concepts to obscure things rather than to illuminate them, language would cease to mean anything and society would become totally opaque to itself, hampering any possibility of social reform.

In short, concepts are used as weapons (among other uses) in socio-political fights. Sharpen yours well and keep an eye on those of your adversary.

A key question IMO is not just "What does the concept describe?" when used is a certain context, but also "What does it hide?"

An example: a long time ago, I was hired by a large multinational to help them diagnose problems and identify potential solutions. So I started to speak about "problems". Soon enough, my boss advised me to stop using that word, and to use the term "issue" instead. It's easy to understand why: in that corporate environment, the word "problem" carries some negativity and implies that someone has not done his work correctly. The term "issue" is neutral and non-threatening. So if you want people to open up about their problems, don't call them "problems"; use a euphemism instead, such as "issues" in order to dissimulate or de-emphasize the potentially conflictual and disruptive character of problem solving in a large corporation.

Answer 2

You ask:

Is conceptual analysis simply a descriptive enterprise—i.e. an attempt to report how a linguistic community actually uses a term—or does it have a normative dimension that prescribes how we ought to use our terms?

And the fact of the matter is that concepts (SEP) are used for both activities because they are supposed to be fundamental building blocks of thought. There are descriptive and normative elements to conceptualization depending on the nature of the language game. Of course, when one attends university, one is ostensibly receiving lots of description of the world. To internalize this is the essence of conceptualization: economics, biology, philosophy, ethics, law, etc. All of these function on a body of knowledge that some psychologists refer to as crystalized intelligence. From WP:

Crystallized intelligence (gc) includes learned procedures and knowledge. It reflects the effects of experience and acculturation. Horn notes that crystallized ability is a "precipitate out of experience," resulting from the prior application of fluid ability that has been combined with the intelligence of culture. Examples of tasks that measure crystallized intelligence are vocabulary, general information, abstract word analogies, and the mechanics of language.

Yet, humans often creatively employ concepts when attempting to solve problem or persuade people of arguments. Consider the definist fallacy, for instance. Here, one can abuse definitions to the point of warping concepts to such an extent, that one in essence reasons from conclusion to premises. Here, we can get to the Orwellian propaganda. From WP:

Propaganda is communication that is primarily used to influence or persuade an audience to further an agenda, which may not be objective and may be selectively presenting facts to encourage a particular synthesis or perception, or using loaded language to produce an emotional rather than a rational response to the information that is being presented.

So, conceptual analysis is an activity that can be used and abused according to the agenda of the agent. Of course, modern analytic philosophy gives one the tools to talk about conceptual analysis. Sometimes it is downright pedantic. But ultimately, what tends to make philosophy philosophy is the use of language to try to facilitate shared meaning. This sort of metaphilosophical theory figures heavily in works such as Deleuze and Guattari's What Is Philosophy?. From WP:

What is Philosophy? is concerned with, among the concepts that the book explores, the plane of immanence, conceptual personae, geophilosophy, functives, prospects, affects, percepts and chaos, as well as concepts in themselves understood as basic components of philosophy.