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What is the logical meaning of the word 'let' as used in mathematical theorems and definitions?

For example:

Let g be differentiable on an open interval O and let cO . . .

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    "Let g be ..." = "Assume that g is ... "
    – Jo Wehler
    Commented Jul 18 at 8:09
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    Universal quantification / dependent function type. See also my answer here for a modern account: philosophy.stackexchange.com/a/114453 Commented Jul 18 at 8:19
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    Yes, although I wouldn't phrase it in this way — X : AffineSpace is a judgement, not a proposition, so instead of assuming it is true I would simply say "if X is an affine space and O is a point of X, then ?(O)" — but this is a nitpick. This is exactly what is meant by a sentence like "let X be an affine space and O be a point of X; then ?(O)". Commented Jul 18 at 8:53
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    There might be a distinction to make between "let" for naming a known object and "let" to write a proof in all generality. When you say "Let c \in O" it's different than when you say "Let phi = (1 + sqrt(5))/2". In the latter you're just introducing a name for simplicity's sake, whereas in the former case you're introducing an assumption; you're about to prove that all elements c of O satisfy some property.
    – Stef
    Commented Jul 18 at 9:53
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    They took it from the BASIC programming language :-)
    – Scott Rowe
    Commented Jul 18 at 18:02

6 Answers 6

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'Let' is a local definition or identity. It is common in algebra where we assign symbols to values, but it can be used in many ways.

Teacher: "Let the area of the field be A..."

Student: "But, Sir, what if it isn't?"

Many years ago, this gave me pause. Could the student have a point? I don't think so. If A is the area of the field and the field gets larger, either A gets larger, or A was the area of the field at some particular time. Or maybe the rest of the problem leads to some absurdity such that A cannot have a value. Or the definition turns out to be inadequate, and we have to revise it.

'Let' is a local definition. It is limited to some context. A is not tied to the area of a field forever. The definition will expire when the context does.

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    This answer is correct. It means, "I'm introducing a new name and defining it like this". Commented Jul 18 at 16:09
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    I would say to the student: "Let them eat cake then." :-)
    – Scott Rowe
    Commented Jul 18 at 18:06
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    In some computer languages, including early versions of BASIC "LET" actually meant that. Commented Jul 19 at 3:26
  • @DJClayworth I remember using LET in BASIC. That isn't quite the same thing. We have put the area of our field into a variable named A. We can then copy it to a variable named B with "LET B = A". But if we change A, then B does not change. It would be closer if A and B were two names for the same variable. You can do that in some languages. Commented Jul 19 at 8:36
  • @RichardKirk Depends on whether you have value types or reference types. If a is a reference type, then using (let) a = ... will define a as whatever is on the right side in most programming languages. The definition is local is precisely defined meaning depending on programming language.
    – JF Meier
    Commented Jul 19 at 11:16
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No specific "logical meaning".

Let: "to allow someone to do something".

See e.g van Dalen, page 8:

Theorem (Induction Principle): Let A be a property...

Thus, the use is: to introduce an assumption, an object with some specified property, etc that is relevant for the proof.

See D.J. Velleman, How to Prove It (Cambridge, 2006) page x:

Mathematical proofs are also constructed by combining certain basic proof structures. [...] sentences like “Let x be arbitrary” and “Suppose P” are not isolated steps in proofs, but are used to introduce the “for arbitrary x prove” and “suppose-until” proof structures.

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    The use of "let" in mathematics has nothing to do with "to allow someone to do something". Commented Jul 18 at 16:11
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    Yes it does, in English it is the imperative of allow. Let it be!
    – Badger
    Commented Jul 19 at 2:29
  • +1 'Let' is indeed the way of introducing an assumption or supposition, but to say that this is not logical goes against the grain of proof-theoretic semantics. John Corcoran in some of his papers uses the left corner as an assumption operator, and uses the term suppositional proof to discuss natural deduction where introducing and discharging assumptions is a logical operation.
    – J D
    Commented Jul 19 at 11:46
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    @Badger But that's still not the same meaning we're discussing here, is it?? The mathematical sense is not about removing any restrictions or hindrances to A being the area; not about providing a way that A could be the area; but about requiring that it be the area.? So mote it be!
    – gidds
    Commented Jul 19 at 12:22
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    @gidds Same meaning? I think it is indeed related. If mathematical proof is viewed through the lens of a discourse grammar, as some are wont to argue, then the 'let' is an imperative because the proof is an expository artifact. That is, the purpose of the proof is to provide another a set of instructions on how to reason. In this way, one who has successfully reasoned from set P to statement c is providing an instruction to one who has not. That such a grammatical feature becomes a speech act and acquires additional meaning seems quite natural.
    – J D
    Commented Jul 19 at 15:08
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When stating a theorem

Formally/syntactically, this is statement in the informal language introducing a variable with some qualifications that serve as the hypotheses of the theorem. Logically it might something like (why doesn't philosophy stack exchange support Latex??)

(For all g)(for all o)(for all c)(if (g is a function and o is an interval in the domain of g and c in O) then <some theorem follows>...)

We are using the formal variables of the formal languages, using "for all" quantification, and then applying the conditions stated in the "let..." statement as logical conditions in the antecedent of the main if... then ... construction of the theorem.

When Giving a Name to a Constructed Object

An example is given in the comments of defining phi = (1 + sqrt(5))/2. In this case we are doing a move of extension by definition. In this case we are adding a brand new letter to our formal language called phi. We have given a condition that defines phi. However, we cannot freely define new characters. We must be able to prove that there is a single unique element satisfying the condition used to define phi. If we do this then we can prove that the new language and theory that arise after this extension by definition is a conservative extension over the old theory. Informally, this means that we can't prove "new" theorems by introducing this new symbol to theory. It is just essentially an abbreviation for convenience.

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Simple Example: If you want to prove that for all real numbers x, P(x) is true, you might start your proof with, "Let y be any real number." (Or simply, "Let y be a real number.") Then suppose you can derive "P(y)" without introducing any other assumptions. Then you can infer, as required that, for all real numbers x, P(x) is true.

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  • The question is about the word 'let'. It is not about the indefinite article 'a'. Commented Jul 21 at 5:51
  • @Speakpigeon In this example I was simply using the word "let" to introduce a provisional assumption (y is a real number) that was eventually to be discharged to obtain a universal generalization (for all real numbers x, P(x) is true). Commented Jul 22 at 19:52
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You ask:

What is the logical meaning of the word 'let' when used in mathematical texts?

It depends on how seriously you take precision in your explanation. To explain it to a high school student, 'let' is simply an indicator in a proof to assign a value, presume existence of an abstract object, or to make a truth by declaration. For instance, letters which are often used as variables can be assigned a value. 'Let x which is a natural be 4' is an example that narrows the domain of discourse from all naturals to the value four. In this scope of the proof, x has now become a constant value because it will not change. Thus, this periphrastic imperative construction often carries overtones of presumptive rather than certain assertoric force. In other words, as in Mauro's answer, it is used to introduce an assumption or supposition sometimes to be discharged later

But, we can go into more detail about its status by discussing proof-theoretic semantics and natural deduction (IEP) to guide us in our thinking. In order to have a logical calculus, three things are required: a language L, which gives us our syntax, a rule set of inferences, which allows us to transform our grammatical constructions, and a set of axioms, which provide semantic content for the system. For instance, in a natural language proof in English at the secondary level, English and arithmetical syntax are our language, our language includes various axioms such identity a=a, commutativity of addition a+b=b+a, and associativity of addition (a+b)+c=a+(b+c). And for transformations, we can use rules such as a=b->a+k=b+k. Our proofs then follow our grammar, rules, and stay consistent with our axioms.

Sometimes, we have to assume things to determine if other things are true. For instance, in solving a system of equations, we may want to test possible domain values x where x is a natural number. 'Let x be 5' is a unit of discourse which brings about an effect above and beyond assignment of a value to a variable. It functions effectively as assigning a truth value on a presumptive basis so that it might be read as ("x=5 should be held as true"). So, we have assigned using an imperative utterance (the locutionary force), but have done more than the literal assignment. We have signaled to the agent parsing the proof they should assert the truth of the statement (the perlocutionary force).

Thus, like the expression, 'Hereby this assignment, this equation is true', we have accomplished a step in the mind of the agent attempting the proof, but using the third-person passive form of imperative. Like the imperative form in the second-person with the implied you ([you] make it be!), the third-person also has an implied grammatical subject: [reader] Let x be 5. Thus in our search for solutions for the system of equation, the agent who is providing the proof has implicitly guided the reader who is learning the proof the right place to assign a truth value.

If it happens the suppositional logic carries us to a contradiction, it may be that the value assigned, in this case 5, is wrong and cannot be equal to x. For instance, when dealing with parallel lines, the two lines will have no points in common, and therefore the assignment of a domain value will never allow us to calculate a range value that gives us a consistent system. We can then discharge assumption if making it gets us to violate the law of identity and arrive at an equation which says "4=5" for instance. Such a contradiction is a cue that our supposition, which is not an axiom in arithmetic, was useful but led to a proof by contradiction.

Alternatively, let as Jagerber48's answer gives, might be an actual conservative extension to a theory as an extension by definition. In this case, we have created what we in the CS world call syntactic sugar. We have introduced, by the imperative, a constant new term to represent a more complex expression. From WP:

an extension by definition formalizes the introduction of a new symbol by means of a definition. For example, it is common in naive set theory to introduce a symbol ? for the set that has no member.

Thus, we have not extended the axioms, but merely simplified the language by having one symbol represent a more complex construction making the language more comprehensible and ergonomic.

Note, we can also use the 'let' to bind variables to specific domains of discourse, such as presuming a statement which contains an extension in set-builder notation. For example, consider the the WP article on free and bound variables in the section on proof:

The variable n is introduced as an arbitrary but particular element of a set. The statement "Let n be..." implicitly functions as a universal quantifier, binding n for the scope of the proof. The proof establishes a property for this single, arbitrary n , which licenses the general conclusion that the property holds for all positive even integers... The variable k, on the other hand, is bound by an existential quantifier

And lastly, if you're familiar with Tarskian semantics, then it becomes clear that 'let' is not a part of the object language we are proving concepts with, but rather metalanguage of the theory with which we conduct proof. Alternatively, the logical historian John Corcoran in some of his work considers such constructions in the light of discourse grammar. This is why it would be appropriate as Dummett, Prawitz, and others are concerned, you are dealing with proof-theoretic semantics (SEP). See Prawitz's Natural Deduction: a Proof-Theoretical Study (GB) for a review of formalisms that attempts to capture the spirit of natural reasoning conducted by mathematicians.

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  • Let this be the accepted answer.
    – Scott Rowe
    Commented Jul 19 at 22:03
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    @ScottRowe Excellent example of how the imperative can be constructed meaningfully and grammatically, and yet fail to achieve the aim of a speech act, thus lacking perlocutionary or performative force! :D
    – J D
    Commented Jul 20 at 18:43
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A mathematical judgment, like a=1 (same as let a equal one), sets the context for a formal system.

What is a formal system?

Essentially, a formal system is a set of axioms (a=1 is an axiom), concepts (we assume a is a variable that can take values), and consequent theorems (deductions which can be finally reduced to the axioms); all expressed (formalized) with a formal language, that is, a set of statements with specific properties expressed with symbols.

In simple words, to formalize something means essentially to write it.

From an epistemological standpoint:

  • A formal system is a tautology (there must not be contradictions),
  • Has not necessarily logical relationships with empirical reality (the core structure of empirical truth we use to reason). For example, an axiom can be Let X be a set of the people without heads; although there is an empirical fallacy in such statement (in order to be counted as people, the element must have a head), it is still logically valid.

Another example: Conway's Game Of Life is a Formal System that defines the rules of a particular context, but this has no relationship with reality.

The notion of formal systems is based on Systems Theory, which defines the rules by which we choose rational elements and use them for the same goal as mathematics and logic: to develop knowledge and predict the future. For example, you can develop an informal system (for example, a context, a situation) based on two theoretical facts (axioms): a) you go shopping; b) you forget your wallet. Of course, you can predict multiple situations (conclusions, which are the equivalent to theorems in a formal system) in which you can go to prison.

In other words, logical systems (formal or informal), which are essentially rational*. allow us to develop ideas as contexts isolated from reality.

* A house is just a bunch of atoms, not a set of rooms or bricks; even if you can live in a house, the idea is essentially rational, the house-system is not really physical.

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  • "let a equal one" is not a "judgement", nor is it the same as "a=1", which may be false depending on what "a" is.
    – OrangeDog
    Commented Jul 20 at 11:38
  • @OrangeDog from a epistemic and systemic perspective, a judgment is a relationship between two concepts (systems). "The sky" is not a judgment (in fact, this is a concept). "The sky is blue " IS a judgment, which can be expressed as [sky]--[blue], which is equivalent to [a]--[1]. Sorry for the syntactic error (corrected), although anyway it was helpful for you to enforce your argument. In addition, a=1 is used in this context as an imperative ("Let ..."), not a logical condition: a takes imperatively the value of 1, "Let ..." does not mean that a is being compared to 1.
    – RodolfoAP
    Commented Jul 21 at 7:29
  • All your examples are still wrong. a=1 is not the same as let a equal one. If you want a logical symbol for it, then a:=1 is conventual. "The sky is blue" is a statement that may be true or false. It is not the same as "let the sky be blue".
    – OrangeDog
    Commented Jul 21 at 8:25

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